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Abstract—Motivated by the need to develop simulation tools
for verification and validation of autonomous driving systems
operating in traffic consisting of both autonomous and human-
driven vehicles, we propose a framework for modeling vehicle in-
teractions at uncontrolled intersections. The proposed interaction
modeling approach is based on game theory with multiple con-
current leader-follower pairs, and accounts for common traffic
rules. We parameterize the intersection layouts and geometries to
model uncontrolled intersections with various configurations, and
apply the proposed approach to model the interactive behavior
of vehicles at these intersections. Based on simulation results
in various traffic scenarios, we show that the model exhibits
reasonable behavior expected in traffic, including the capability of
reproducing scenarios extracted from real-world traffic data and
reasonable performance in resolving traffic conflicts. The model
is further validated based on the level-of-service traffic qual-
ity rating system and demonstrates manageable computational
complexity compared to traditional multi-player game-theoretic
models.
I. INTRODUCTION
To provide safer, cleaner, and more efficient transportation
is the promise of autonomous driving technologies [1]. Thanks
to the serious efforts that have been made in both academia and
industry to pursue this goal, advances in perception, decision-
making/planning, control theory, and computing systems have
made fully autonomous driving possible [2]. However, before
autonomous vehicles can be deployed in mass production,
their control systems need to be tested and validated in terms
of guaranteeing safety and performance when operating in
various traffic environments, which remains a challenging
problem [3]. On the one hand, simulation tools can be used for
quick and safe virtual tests of these systems and to reduce the
time and cost of road tests. On the other hand, the reliability
of virtual tests depends on the fidelity of the simulations in
terms of modeling traffic scenarios.
In the near to medium term, autonomous vehicles will op-
erate in traffic scenarios together with human-driven vehicles,
where interactions between autonomous vehicles and human-
driven vehicles will constantly occur. Among different traffic
scenarios, the interactive behavior of vehicles at intersections
may be particularly complex. An autonomous driving system
must account for these interactions to be able to operate safely
at an intersection.
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By types of traffic control, intersections can be classified
as signal-controlled, “stop” or “yield” sign-controlled, and
uncontrolled [4]. Uncontrolled intersections are intersections
without traffic signals or signs, and are common in both urban
and rural settings over the world [5]–[7]. According to the
U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s fatality
analysis report, more than one fourth of fatal crashes in the
U.S. occur at or are related to intersections, and about 50%
of these occur at uncontrolled intersections [8].
At an uncontrolled intersection, due to the lack of guidance
from traffic signals or signs, drivers/automations need to
decide whether, when, and how to enter and pass through
the intersection on their own; in this case, accounting for the
interactions among vehicles is particularly important. Failures
in accounting for these interactions may cause deadlocks if
driving overly conservatively – the vehicles may get stuck and
never pass through the intersection, or may cause collisions if
driving overly aggressively.
Advanced strategies that have been proposed for handling
interactive traffic at intersections include cooperative driving,
where vehicles cooperate with each other and with road
infrastructure to resolve traffic conflicts. They may cooperate
through vehicle-to-vehicle negotiations [9]–[11], or through
coordination by a centralized traffic “manager” in the ap-
proach called “autonomous intersection management” [12]–
[14]. Although strategies based on cooperative driving have
been shown to be capable of improving intersection traffic
safety and efficiency, they rely on dense penetration of vehicle-
to-vehicle and/or vehicle-to-infrastructure communications as
well as autonomous driving systems, which will likely not be
the case in the near to medium term.
Alternative strategies have been focused on individual con-
trol of the autonomous ego vehicle. To account for the in-
teractions among vehicles, approaches based on, e.g., online
verification using reachability analysis [15], [16], receding-
horizon optimization [17], [18], learning [19], and game theory
[20]–[24], may be used. Although these approaches establish
theoretical foundations of creating autonomous vehicles that
are capable of handling interactive traffic at uncontrolled
intersections, they must be calibrated and validated to achieve
control systems that provide promised safety and performance.
Simulation tools used for virtual tests of these control sys-
tems are supposed to be capable of representing the interactive
behavior of vehicles with reasonable fidelity, which motivates
the development of approaches to modeling vehicle interac-
tions. In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretic vehicle
interaction modeling approach for uncontrolled intersections.
Game theory is in general a suitable tool for modeling
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
05
42
3v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  1
0 A
pr
 20
19
2strategic interaction between rational decision-makers [25],
and has been exploited for modeling driver/vehicle interactions
at intersections by several researchers.
In [20], the vehicle-to-vehicle interactions at an intersection
are modeled based on normal-form games – the vehicles
select actions between “Stop” and “Go” based on their payoff
matrices. The performance of the approach in [20] is limited
by the limited number of action choices (i.e., two) and the
fact that the dynamic behavior of the vehicles is not explicitly
taken into account when the payoff matrices are designed. For
instance, as the number of interacting vehicles increases to
6, almost half of the simulation runs following the approach
of [20] lead to deadlocks. In [21], the interactions between
a human-driven vehicle and an autonomous vehicle are mod-
eled based on a two-player game formulation, where vehicle
dynamics are explicitly accounted for. The results of a two-
vehicle traffic scenario on an one-lane four-way intersection
where both vehicles are going straight to cross the intersection
are reported. Extensions of this approach to more vehicles have
not been reported and may not be straightforward due to both
theoretical limitations and computational challenges.
In our previous work [26]–[28], a game-theoretic framework
for modeling vehicle-to-vehicle interactions in multi-vehicle
highway traffic scenarios has been proposed. The framework
is based on the application of level-K game theory [29],
[30] and explicitly takes into account the dynamic behavior
of the vehicles. The vehicle driving policies are determined
using reinforcement learning. Once the policies have been
obtained offline, highway traffic scenarios with a possibly large
number of interacting vehicles can be modeled with minimum
online computational effort. Such a level-K game-theoretic
framework has also been extended to model the interactions
between two vehicles at an uncontrolled two-lane four-way
intersection in [31]. However, generalizations to more complex
intersection traffic scenarios, e.g., with more than 2 interacting
vehicles and at intersections of various configurations, have not
been addressed.
The contributions of the present paper are: 1) We pro-
pose a novel framework based on a formulation of dy-
namic/sequential leader-follower games with multiple con-
current leader-follower pairs and receding-horizon optimiza-
tion for modeling the interactive behavior of vehicles at
uncontrolled intersections. The framework explicitly accounts
for the dynamic behavior of the vehicles, decision-making
delays, and common traffic rules. It is generalizable to traffic
scenarios with more than 2 interacting vehicles (results of up
to 10 vehicles are reported) and to intersections of various
configurations. 2) We describe an intersection model that
parameterizes the intersection layouts and geometries so that
uncontrolled intersections with a wide range of configurations
can be modeled using a finite set of parameters. 3) We apply
our interaction modeling approach to the intersection model to
simulate the interactive behavior of vehicles in various uncon-
trolled intersection traffic scenarios (with various numbers of
interacting vehicles, intersection layouts and geometries, etc).
4) Based on simulation results and statistical evaluations, we
show that the model exhibits reasonable behavior expected
in traffic – it can reproduce scenarios extracted from real-
world traffic data and has reasonable performance in resolv-
ing traffic conflicts in complex intersection traffic scenarios.
Furthermore, the model demonstrates a manageable increase
in computational complexity as the number of interacting
vehicles increases. 5) We also describe a generalized version
of the interactive decision-making model of vehicles proposed
in [31] based on level-K games, simulate the interactions
between the model proposed in this paper and this alternative
model, and demonstrate that the model proposed in this paper
is capable of resolving conflicts with different drivers.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present
our game-theoretic approach to model interactive decision-
making of vehicles at uncontrolled intersections. In Section III,
we describe our intersection model with parameterized layouts
and geometries, to which our vehicle interaction modeling
approach is applied. In Section IV, we introduce the kine-
matics model to represent vehicles’ dynamic behavior at
uncontrolled intersections and the reward function design to
represent drivers’ decision-making objectives. In Section V,
we incorporate several additional considerations in our model
to improve the fidelity of our model in imitating the decision-
making processes of human drivers. In Section VI, we consider
a previously proposed interactive decision-making model of
vehicles based on level-K game theory. In Section VII, we
run multiple simulation case studies to comprehensively il-
lustrate and evaluate our proposed framework for modeling
vehicle interactions at uncontrolled intersections. The paper is
summarized and concluded in Section VIII.
II. VEHICLE INTERACTION MODELING BASED ON
LEADER-FOLLOWER GAMES
In this section, we introduce our game-theoretic approach to
model interactive decision-making of vehicles at uncontrolled
intersections. We first describe the logic for leader-follower
role assignment to vehicles at uncontrolled intersections in
Section II-A, which is the foundation for formulating our
leader-follower games. We then describe our vehicle interac-
tive decision-making model based on leader-follower games
in two-vehicle interaction settings in Section II-B, and gen-
eralize it to multi-vehicle interactions based on our proposed
“pairwise leader-follower games” in Section II-C.
A. Leader-follower role assignment to vehicles at uncontrolled
intersections
Human drivers can usually resolve traffic conflicts at uncon-
trolled intersections by following the “right-of-way” rules [32].
The right-of-way rules help the drivers decide who proceeds
first at an intersection. Motivated by the right-of-way rules, we
assign a leader-follower relationship to each pair of vehicles
(denoted by (i, j)) at an intersection based on the following
logic:
(1) If vehicles i, j have both entered the intersection, the
vehicle with a strictly smaller signed distance to the exit
of the intersection is the leader.
(2) If at most one of vehicles i, j has entered the intersection,
the vehicle with a strictly smaller signed distance to the
entrance of the intersection is the leader.
3(3) If no leader-follower relationship has been assigned based
on (1) or (2), then the vehicle on the right is the leader
when the two vehicles are coming from adjacent road
arms.
(4) If no leader-follower relationship has been assigned based
on (1), (2), or (3), then the vehicle going straight is the
leader when the other vehicle is making a turn.
We note that if a vehicle has entered (resp. exited) the
intersection, then its signed distance to the entrance (resp.
exit) of the intersection is the negative of the corresponding
distance. The entrance and exit points of an intersection (see
Fig. 2) are defined in Section III for arbitrary intersection
layouts and geometries.
If vehicle i is the leader of the pair (i, j), we write i ≺ j;
if i is not the leader (i.e., either j is the leader or no leader-
follower relationship has been assigned based on (1)-(4)), we
write i  j.
We note that the relations ≺ and  are not (pre)orders, as
they do not have the transitivity property: if i ≺ j and j ≺ k
(resp. i  j and j  k), then i ≺ k (resp. i  k). This can be
seen by considering the traffic scenario where four vehicles
i, j, k, and l coming from different road arms arrive at the
entrances of a four-way intersection at the same time. Then,
based on the above role assignment logic we have i ≺ j,
j ≺ k, k ≺ l, and l ≺ i. Indeed, this scenario and similar
scenarios where such a cyclic pattern occurs are challenging
scenarios for both human drivers and autonomous vehicles
– they may lead to deadlocks, i.e., no one decides to enter
the intersection or everyone gets stuck in the middle of the
intersection.
The leader-follower role assignment is presented formally
as an algorithm in Section IV, which incorporates the above
logic with vehicle kinematics, intersection layouts, perception
imperfections, etc.
B. Leader-follower game to model two-vehicle interactions
Once a leader-follower relationship has been assigned to a
pair of vehicles (i, j), we use a leader-follower game (also
referred to as a Stackelberg game) to model their interactive
decision-making. We choose to use the Stackelberg model
because it incorporates the asymmetric roles of the two players
and grants one player advantages over the other [33], which
can be used to account for common traffic rules such as that
a car arriving earlier to the intersection typically has the right
of way over a car arriving later to the intersection.
Let γl (resp. γf ) denote an action of the leader (resp.
follower), taking values in an action set Γl (Γf ). Either
player makes decisions on its action choices to maximize
a reward function, denoted by Rl(s, γl, γf ) for the leader
and by Rf (s, γl, γf ) for the follower, where s ∈ S denotes
the present state in which the two players are making their
decisions. When modeling the interactions of two vehicles, s
contains the states of these two vehicles, i.e., s = (si, sj),
where si (resp. sj) denotes the state of vehicle i (resp. vehicle
j) (its detailed definition depends on the vehicle kinematics
model to be used, which is introduced in Section IV-A). The
dependence of either player’s reward on both players’ states
and actions reflects the interactive nature of such a decision-
making process.
Following the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium [33], one
could model the leader-follower decision-making process as
follows:
Q′l(s, γl) := min
γf∈Γ∗f′(s,γl)
Rl(s, γl, γf ),
Γ∗f
′(s, γl) :=
{
γ′f ∈ Γf : Rf (s, γl, γ′f ) ≥ Rf (s, γl, γf ),
∀γf ∈ Γf
}
,
γ∗l ∈ arg max
γl∈Γl
Q′l(s, γl),
γ∗f ∈ arg max
γf∈Γf
Rf (s, γ∗l , γf ). (1)
The actions of the leader and the follower are interdepen-
dent. In particular, the leader has the so-called “first mover
advantage”: the leader controls the follower’s set of rational
actions Γ∗f
′(s, γl) through the leader’s own action choice γl.
In such a game formulation, it is assumed that the leader is
aware that the follower is capable of observing the leader’s
action γl before selecting its own action γf .
However, in the setting of drivers making decisions in
traffic, each driver responds to the actions of other drivers
with a reaction delay. More specifically, each driver can only
observe the actions of other drivers that are applied at time step
t and take them into account in his/her own decision-making
at the next time step t + 1. From the follower’s standpoint,
since it cannot instantly observe and respond to the instant
action of the leader, to secure its possible rewards against the
uncertain action choices of the leader, we assume that it applies
a “maximin” strategy, i.e.,
Qf (s, γf ) := min
γl∈Γl
Rf (s, γl, γf ),
γ∗f ∈ arg max
γf∈Γf
Qf (s, γf ). (2)
We assume that the leader is aware that the follower is using
such a maximin strategy to secure its rewards. Taking this
awareness into account, the leader makes rational decisions
based on:
Ql(s, γl) := min
γf∈Γ∗f (s)
Rl(s, γl, γf ),
Γ∗f (s) :=
{
γ′f ∈ Γf : Qf (s, γ′f ) ≥ Qf (s, γf ),∀γf ∈ Γf
}
,
γ∗l ∈ arg max
γl∈Γl
Ql(s, γl). (3)
We now make assumptions on the uniqueness of maximizers
as follows:
∀ (s, γf ) ∈ S× Γf , ∃! γ′l ∈ Γl such that
Rl(s, γ′l, γf ) ≥ Rl(s, γl, γf ), ∀ γl ∈ Γl;
∀ s ∈ S, ∃! γ′f ∈ Γf such that
min
γl∈Γl
Rf (s, γl, γ′f ) ≥ min
γl∈Γl
Rf (s, γl, γf ), ∀ γf ∈ Γf . (4)
Assumption (4) means that at each traffic state s, for either
player (l or f ), there is one action that is strictly better than
the others to use. Although not strictly required in the leader-
follower decision-making process described by (2) and (3),
4assumption (4) can simplify the mathematical expression of
(2)-(3), i.e.,
Ql(s, γl) = Rl(s, γl, γ∗f ),
Qf (s, γf ) = min
γl∈Γl
Rf (s, γl, γf ),
γ∗l = arg max
γl∈Γl
Ql(s, γl),
γ∗f = arg max
γf∈Γf
Qf (s, γf ). (5)
We also note that based on our reward function design that is
introduced in Section IV-B, assumption (4) holds.
Note that in the game formulation (2) and (3) (and in (5)),
the leader has been given the “first mover advantage” as the
follower applies a maximin strategy, a conservative strategy
assuming worst-case scenarios, whereas the leader is able to
select comparatively more aggressive actions taking advan-
tage of its awareness of the follower’s maximin strategy. An
alternative formulation is to let the leader apply a conservative
maximin strategy, which corresponds to an assumption that the
leader knows that it cannot control the follower’s set of rational
actions Γ∗f (s) through its instant action choice γl since γl is
not instantly observable to the follower. Then, (1) becomes
Q′l(s, γl) = min
γf∈Γf
Rl(s, γl, γf ),
γ∗l = arg max
γl∈Γl
Q′l(s, γl),
γ∗f = arg max
γf∈Γf
Rf (s, γ∗l , γf ). (6)
It is clear that (6) is equal to (5) up to a switch of the roles
“leader” and “follower.” Based on the role assignment criterion
introduced in Section II-A, we choose to use formulation (5)
as it agrees with the common traffic rule that a leader, e.g., a
car arriving earlier to the intersection, typically has the right of
way over a follower, e.g., a car arriving later to the intersection.
C. Pairwise leader-follower game to model multi-vehicle in-
teractions
This section discusses a computationally scalable general-
ization of the vehicle interaction modeling framework based on
leader-follower games proposed in Section II-B to intersection
traffic scenarios with n interacting vehicles, where n ≥ 2.
Although 2-player leader-follower games may be gener-
alized to n-player games through considering a multi-level
decision-making hierarchy, e.g., player k being the leader
of players k + 1, · · · , n and being the follower of play-
ers 1, · · · , k − 1 for every k ∈ {1, · · · , n}, or allowing a
level to accommodate multiple players, e.g., players 2, · · · , n
being the followers of player 1 and applying Nash equilibrium-
based strategies among themselves, such generalizations re-
quire exponentially increased computational efforts to solve
for solutions as the number of players increases. For instance,
a Stackelberg equilibrium solution can be difficult to compute
when n > 3 [34].
Therefore, to handle intersection traffic scenarios with a
possibly large number of traffic participants, we propose an
alternative generalization approach. Our approach relies on
pairwise leader-follower relationships defined for all vehicle
pairs at the intersection, and each vehicle’s decision-making
accounts for all the pairwise leader-follower relationships
related to itself. In particular, vehicle i makes decisions on
its action choices according to:
Q
i
(straffic, γi) := min
j∈{1,··· ,n}, j 6=i
Qi,j(si,j , γi),
Qi,j(si,j , γi) :=
{
Ql(si,j , γi) if i ≺ j,
Qf (si,j , γi) if i  j,
γ∗i ∈ arg max
γi∈Γi
Q
i
(straffic, γi), (7)
where Ql(si,j , γi) (resp. Qf (si,j , γi)) is defined in (5) with
player i being the leader l (resp. the follower f ); the traffic
state straffic contains the states of all interacting vehicles at the
intersection, i.e., straffic = (s1, · · · , sn); and si,j = (si, sj)
represents the state of the vehicle pair (i, j).
The decision-making model (7) can be interpreted as fol-
lows: If i is the follower of j, the secured reward of action
γi is the least reward i may get due to the uncertain action
choice of j; if i is the leader of j, i is aware that the
most aggressive action that j can choose is subject to j’s
maximin principle between their pairwise interactions, and
thus i predicts the reward of action γi by assuming j to apply
its maximin action of their pair. On top of this, to account
for its interactions with all other players, i maximizes the
minimum of its secured/predicted rewards over all pairwise
interactions.
We note that when i is the leader of j, its reward prediction
may be inaccurate as the actually applied action of j is not
only subject to j’s maximin principle between their pairwise
interactions but also subject to j’s interactions with the other
players. However, in the setting of vehicle interactions at
uncontrolled intersections where the central question is “who
goes first,” the above strategy for the leader, i.e., predicting
action rewards by assuming the follower to apply the maximin
action of their pair, is reasonable – if the follower’s maximin
action of their pair is not to go first, the follower will likely
not choose to go first when it maximizes the minimum of its
secured/predicted rewards over all pairwise interactions. With
this strategy, the pairwise leader is able to select comparatively
more aggressive actions than the pairwise follower. And as a
result, if there is an overall leader, i.e., the leader in every
pairwise leader-follower relationship related to itself, it can
take comparatively most aggressive actions than all other
players, e.g., to go first. The effectiveness of decision-making
model (7) in resolving traffic conflicts at uncontrolled intersec-
tions, i.e., driving every vehicle safely through the intersection
without causing collisions or deadlocks, is illustrated through
multiple simulation case studies in Section VII. Furthermore,
decision-making model (7) decouples the n-player interactions
into pairwise interactions, and thus significantly decreases the
computational complexity in solving for solutions. It also
agrees with intuition – when driving in traffic, a driver may
focus more on the interactions between each neighbouring
driver and him/herself than on the interactions among the other
drivers.
5We note also that our strategy based on leader-follower
games is not equivalent to a rule-based strategy where “who
goes first” is determined by specified rules or logic, e.g., a
strategy where a follower always waits until a leader passes
through the intersection before the follower itself enters the
intersection. Our leader-follower game based strategy allows
a follower to enter the intersection even when a leader is
still in the intersection, for instance, in situations where
the follower’s action choices have minor conflicts with the
leader’s action choices. Whether or not the follower’s action
choices have conflicts with the leader’s action choices and how
these conflicts influence their interactive decision-making are
represented and automatically handled by the decision-making
process (7).
III. PARAMETERIZED INTERSECTION AND VEHICLE PATH
MODELING
Simulation tools used for verification and validation of
autonomous vehicles are supposed to cover a sufficiently rich
set of traffic scenarios. For instance, intersections in real-world
road networks can have different layouts (e.g., number of road
arms) and geometries (e.g., angles between road arms and lane
width). To model traffic scenarios at intersections of various
layouts and geometries, in this section, we first describe an
intersection model that parameterizes the intersection layouts
and geometries and then present an approach to model the
paths of vehicles at the intersections. Although there has been
a rich literature on path planning for vehicles [35], our vehicle
path model is simple but sufficient for our purpose. Moreover,
both the intersection and vehicle path models described in this
section are designed in such a way that they are convenient
for the application of our vehicle interaction model described
in Section II.
A. Parameterized intersection modeling
We characterize the layout and geometry of an intersection
using a set of parameters, i.e.,(
N, {M (m)f }Nm=1, {M (m)b }Nm=1, {φ(m)}Nm=1, wlane
)
, (8)
where N is the number of road arms of the intersection,
M
(m)
f ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · } and M (m)b ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · } are, re-
spectively, the numbers of forward and backward lanes1 of
the mth arm, φ(m) is the counter-clockwise angle of the mth
arm with respect to the x-axis, and wlane is the lane width2
(see Fig. 1(a)). We note that M (m)f = 0 (or M
(m)
b = 0)
represents one-way road, and M (m)f = 0 and M
(m)
b = 0
should not happen at the same time. We assume that the road
centerlines3 of all the road arms intersect at the same point,
which is referred to as the intersection center with coordinates
(xo, yo) = (0, 0).
1A “forward” lane (resp. a “backward” lane) is a lane for traffic “entering
the intersection” (resp. “moving away from the intersection”).
2We assume that all of the lanes have the same width although in principle
they do not have to.
3The road centerlines are the lane markings that separate lanes of traffic
moving in the opposite directions.
In this paper, we consider three-way, four-way, and five-
way intersections (see Fig. 1(b)), i.e., N ∈ {3, 4, 5}, as they
are most common in real-world road networks.
x-axis
y-axis
φ(1) φ(2)
φ(3)
φ(4)
(x(0), y(0))
(x(ρen), y(ρen))
(x(ρex), y(ρex))
wlane
ff
@
@@I
?
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1: Intersection geometry and topology. (a) A four-way
intersection, where the orange dashed lines are the road
centerlines, the black dashed lines are the lane markings that
separate lanes of traffic moving in the same directions, the
black solid lines are the road boundaries, and the shaded
polygons are off-road regions. (b) The topologies of three-way,
four-way, and five-way intersections, where the black sticks
indicate road arms in their nominal directions and the shaded
areas indicate the admissible directional variations for the road
arms.
Given a set of parameters (8), the lane markings and road
boundaries of the mth arm can be expressed according to
x sin(φ(m))− y cos(φ(m)) + kwlane
2
= 0, (9)
where k ∈ {−2M (m)b , · · · , 2M (m)f }. When k = 2M (m)f
(resp. k = −2M (m)b ), (9) represents the right-hand-side road
boundary when looking in the forward direction (resp. in the
backward direction); when k ∈ 2{M (m)f −1, · · · , 1} (resp. k ∈
2{−M (m)b + 1, · · · ,−1}), (9) represents a lane marking that
separates two lanes of traffic moving in the forward direction
(resp. in the backward direction); when k = 0, (9) represents
the road centerline; and when k ∈ 2{M (m)f , · · · , 1}− 1 (resp.
k ∈ 2{−M (m)b , · · · ,−1} + 1), (9) represents the center of a
forward lane (resp. backward lane).
On the basis of (9), we assign an “entrance point” to each
forward lane, (x(ρen), y(ρen)), which indicates entering the
intersection, as follows: We first locate the N intersection
corners4. The line segment connecting each pair of adjacent
4An intersection corner is the intersection point of two adjacent road
boundaries.
6corners is referred to as the “entrance line” of the corre-
sponding road arm. The entrance point of each forward lane
is determined as the intersection point of its center and the
entrance line of the road arm it belongs to.
On the other hand, we also assign “exit points” indicating
exiting the intersection, (x(ρex), y(ρex)), which are used in
determining the leader-follower relationships between vehicles
(see Section II-A). In particular, the determination of an exit
point is coupled with our model for vehicle path, which is
described in the next section.
We note that the parameterized intersection model described
above corresponds to the right-hand traffic [36]. To model
intersections in the context of left-hand traffic requires cor-
responding and straightforward modifications.
B. Vehicle path modeling
We assume that vehicles can plan their paths according
to their origin lanes and target lanes5 before entering the
intersection and follow these pre-planned paths to pass through
the intersection. Such an assumption is often adopted in the
literature [37]. When there are conflicts between vehicles, they
can adjust their speeds along the paths according to their
interactions with each other. In this section, we describe our
vehicle path model.
At first, we specify the origin lane and target lane of each
vehicle to be modeled. When specifying the origin lane and
target lane, some constraints representing common traffic rules
can be enforced, including: 1) given an origin road arm, if the
target road arm corresponds to a left turn, then the origin lane
(resp. the target lane) must be the leftmost forward lane of
the origin road arm (resp. the leftmost backward lane of the
target road arm); 2) given an origin road arm, if the target road
arm corresponds to a right turn, then the origin lane (resp. the
target lane) must be the rightmost forward lane of the origin
road arm (resp. the rightmost backward lane of the target road
arm); and 3) when going straight, if the origin lane is the ηth
forward lane from the left of the origin road arm, then the
target lane must be the η′th backward lane from the left of
the target road arm m, where η′ = min(η,M (m)b ).
In particular, given the intersection layout and geometry, we
determine whether a vehicle is “making a left turn,” “going
straight,” or “making a right turn” based on the angle between
its origin road arm and target road arm. When the clockwise
angle from its origin road arm to its target road arm is in
the interval (0, 3pi4 ], then it is “making a left turn”; when the
angle is in the interval ( 3pi4 ,
5pi
4 ), then it is “going straight”; it
is “making a right turn” otherwise. We also note that U-turns
are not considered in this paper, i.e., the origin lane and the
target lane of a vehicle must belong to two different road arms.
Once the origin lane and target lane of a vehicle is specified,
we assign the vehicle an “initial point,” (xini, yini), located
in the center of its origin lane and a “terminal point,”
(xterm, yterm), located in the center of its target lane. After
that, we model the vehicle’s path, P , as a curve composed of
5The origin lane and the target lane of a vehicle are, respectively, the lane
where it is driving before entering the intersection and the lane that it is going
to after exiting the intersection.
three segments. The first segment is a line segment with the
two end points being (xini, yini) and the intersection entrance
point (x(ρen), y(ρen)) of the origin lane (see Section III-A).
Similarly, the third segment is a line segment with (xterm, yterm)
as one of its end points and extending in the direction of
the target lane. The second segment is an arc that connects
the first segment and the third segment, tangential to the first
segment at (x(ρen), y(ρen)) and tangential to the third segment,
where the point of tangency is defined as the intersection exit
point, (x(ρex), y(ρex)), associated with path P6. Thus, P is
a smooth curve. For any point on the curve, (x, y) ∈ P ,
we define ρ as the length of the curve piece from (xini, yini)
to (x, y). Note that the curve P can be expressed as an
injective function of ρ since P does not intersect itself, i.e.,
any point on the curve can be determined by a unique ρ.
In particular, we have (x(0), y(0)) = (xini, yini), i.e., the
initial point is the location of the vehicle when its traveled
distance along the path is zero. Also, we let ρen (resp. ρex)
denote the value of ρ corresponding to the point on P with
coordinates (x(ρen), y(ρen)) (resp. (x(ρex), y(ρex)))7, i.e., the
vehicle enters (resp. exits) the intersection when its traveled
distance along the path is ρen (resp. ρex).
To facilitate reproducing the results of this paper, the func-
tions used to generate P given the coordinates of (xini, yini),
(xterm, yterm), and (x(ρen), y(ρen)) are explicitly provided in
Appendix A.
Based on the above descriptions, the path of a vehicle can be
determined given its origin lane and target lane and represented
as
P : R→ R2, ρ 7→
[
x(ρ)
y(ρ)
]
, (10)
where ρ represents the distance the vehicle has traveled along
the path. In particular, we define the signed distance of the
vehicle to the entrance (resp. exit) of the intersection as
∆ρen = ρen − ρ (resp. ∆ρex = ρex − ρ) so that ∆ρen(t) < 0
(resp. ∆ρex(t) < 0) represents that the vehicle has entered
(resp. exited) the intersection.
IV. VEHICLE KINEMATICS AND REWARDS AT
UNCONTROLLED INTERSECTIONS
In this section, we introduce the model to represent vehicles’
dynamic behavior and the reward function to represent drivers’
objectives at uncontrolled intersections.
A. Vehicle kinematics
We represent a vehicle using a rectangle bounding the
vehicle’s geometric contour projected onto the ground. This
rectangle is referred to as the “collision zone” (c-zone) as
an overlap of two vehicles’ c-zones indicates a danger of
collision. To fully characterize the c-zone of a vehicle, we need
a 5-tuple, (x, y, θ, lc, wc), where (x, y) are the coordinates
of its geometric center, θ is the vehicle’s heading angle (the
counter-clockwise angle of the vehicle’s heading direction with
6So (x(ρex), y(ρex)) is the other end point of the third segment.
7So it is reasonable to name the intersection entrance (resp. exit) point as
(x(ρen), y(ρen)) (resp. (x(ρex), y(ρex))) in the first place.
7respect to the x-axis), and lc (resp. wc) is the length (resp.
width) of the rectangle.
On the basis of the vehicle path model (10) and the
assumption that the vehicle can follow its pre-planned path
P perfectly, (x, y) can be written as functions of ρ, i.e.,
(x(ρ), y(ρ)), and the vehicle’s heading angle θ(ρ) can be
computed using the path geometry as follows:
θ(ρ) = lim
h→0+
arctan2
(
y(ρ+h)−y(ρ), x(ρ+h)−x(ρ)
)
, (11)
which, using the fact that P is smooth, can be written as
θ(ρ) = arctan2
(dy
dρ
,
dx
dρ
)
. (12)
Based on (10)-(12) and the assumption above, the dynamic
behavior of a vehicle can be fully characterized by the dynam-
ics of ρ as follows:
ρ(t+ 1) = ρ(t) + v(t) ∆t,
v(t+ 1) = v(t) + a(t) ∆t, (13)
where t denotes the discrete time instant, v(t) ∈ [vmin, vmax]
and a(t) denote, respectively, the vehicle’s speed and acceler-
ation at t, and ∆t is the sampling period.
We collect all relevant variables and define the state of a
vehicle as an 8-tuple, i.e.,
s(t) =
(P, ρ(t), v(t), x(ρ(t)), y(ρ(t)), θ(ρ(t)),
∆ρen(t),∆ρex(t)
)
. (14)
The vehicle kinematics at a typical two-lane four-way inter-
section are illustrated in Fig. 2. The blue rectangle represents
the vehicle’s c-zone where the end with double lines is the
vehicle’s front end. The blue dotted curve represents the pre-
planned path P . The states x(t), y(t) and θ(t) can be com-
puted using the traveled distance along the path ρ(t) and the
path geometry. The green triangles represent the intersection
entrance points (x(ρen), y(ρen)) and the red triangles represent
the intersection exit points (x(ρex), y(ρex)).
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Fig. 2: Vehicle kinematics model.
To adjust speed along the path, we assume that a vehicle
has a finite number of acceleration levels to choose from at
each time step, i.e.,
a(t) ∈ A = {a1, · · · , aM}, ∀ t. (15)
On the basis of the model representing vehicles’ dynamic
behavior at uncontrolled intersections described above, we
now present the leader-follower role assignment logic in
Section II-A formally as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Leader-follower role assignment
Input : an ordered pair of vehicles (i, j) and their states(
si(t), sj(t)
)
Output: whether i is the leader of j
1 if (∆ρeni (t) ≤ 0 and ∆ρenj (t) ≤ 0) and
∆ρexi (t) < ∆ρ
ex
j (t)− δ then i ≺ j;
2 else if (∆ρeni (t) > 0 or ∆ρenj (t) > 0) and
∆ρeni (t) < ∆ρ
en
j (t)− δ then i ≺ j;
3 else if i and j are coming from adjacent ways and i’s
way is on the right of j’s way then i ≺ j;
4 else if i is going straight and j is making a turn then
i ≺ j;
5 else i  j.
In Algorithm 1, δ ≥ 0 is a threshold for differentiating the
distances, accounting for the fact that drivers can only estimate
the distances with limited accuracy. In particular, we assume
that drivers cannot recognize which distance is smaller when
|∆ρeni (t)−∆ρenj (t)| ≤ δ (resp. |∆ρexi (t)−∆ρexj (t)| ≤ δ). On
the basis of Algorithm 1, at most one of outcomes i ≺ j or j ≺
i can take place. It may happen that i  j and j  i. In such
a case, both vehicles will view themselves as followers and
thus make conservative decisions. In line 4, “going straight”
and “making a turn” need to be differentiated, which has been
described for arbitrary intersection layouts and geometries in
Section III-B.
B. Reward function
Basic goals of a driver at an intersection include: 1) to
maintain safety, e.g., to not have a collision with another
vehicle, 2) to keep a reasonable distance from other vehicles
to improve safety and comfort, and 3) to pass through the
intersection and get to his/her target under traffic rules and in
a timely manner.
We assume that common traffic rules, such as that a left turn
can only be made when the vehicle is entering the intersection
from a left-turn lane (usually the leftmost forward lane), and
speed limits, have been incorporated in path planning (see
Section III-B) and in speed bounds v(t) ∈ [vmin, vmax]. Then,
the other goals can be represented using a reward function as
follows:
R(t) =
N∑
τ=1
λτ−1R(τ |t), (16)
where R(τ |t) is a predicted stage reward at time instant t+ τ
with the prediction made at the current time instant t, N is the
prediction horizon, and λ ∈ [0, 1] is a factor discounting future
rewards. The stage reward is defined as a linear combination
of three terms, each of which represents a goal introduced
above, i.e.,
R(τ |t) = w1cˆ(τ |t) + w2sˆ(τ |t) + w3vˆ(τ |t), (17)
8where wi > 0, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are weighting factors, and the
terms cˆ(τ |t), sˆ(τ |t), and vˆ(τ |t) are further explained below.
On the basis of our decision-making model (7), the ego
vehicle making decisions considers its interactions with each
of the other vehicles separately. Let vehicle i denote the
ego vehicle and vehicle j denote the vehicle in the pairwise
interaction with vehicle i.
· Collision avoidance, cˆ :
cˆ(τ |t) = −(1 + Sc(τ |t) + wˆ|vi(τ |t)vj(τ |t)|) I(Sc(τ |t) > 0),
where Sc(τ |t) ≥ 0 is the predicted area of the intersec-
tion of vehicle i and j’s c-zones, vi(τ |t) and vj(τ |t) are,
respectively, vehicle i and j’s predicted speeds, wˆ > 0 is
a tunable parameter, and I(·) is an indicator function taking
1 if (·) holds and 0 otherwise. The c-zone of a vehicle is
defined at the beginning of Section IV-A, which is a rectangle
characterized by the 5-tuple (x, y, θ, lc, wc). Thus, Sc(τ |t) is
determined by the predicted states of vehicle i and j, i.e.,
Sc(τ |t) = Sc
(
si(τ |t), sj(τ |t)
)
.
The term cˆ is designed in the above form so that if Sc(τ |t) =
0, i.e., there is no danger of collision, then cˆ(τ |t) = 0; if
Sc(τ |t) > 0, i.e., there is a danger of collision, then the penalty
depends on the c-zone intersection area Sc and the vehicle
speeds vi and vj . In particular, larger penalties are imposed for
larger Sc values and for larger absolute values of vi and vj as
they imply more severe collisions; the parameter wˆ > 0 adjusts
the relative contribution of intersection area versus speeds; and
the addition of 1 ensures a minimum penalty for collisions.
· Separation, sˆ:
sˆ(τ |t) = −(1 + Ss(τ |t) + wˆ|vi(τ |t)vj(τ |t)|) I(Ss(τ |t) > 0),
where Ss(τ |t) ≥ 0 is the predicted area of the intersection
of vehicle i and j’s “separation zones” (s-zones). The s-zone
of a vehicle is defined as a rectangle that shares the same
longitudinal line of symmetry with the vehicle’s c-zone and
over-bounds the c-zone with a safety margin (see Fig. 3). It can
be fully characterized by a 6-tuple (x, y, θ, ls,f, ls,r, ws), where
ls,f, ls,r ≥ lc/2 and ws ≥ wc. In particular, when vehicle i
is the leader (resp. the follower) in its pairwise interaction
with vehicle j, vehicle i assumes that both vehicles have
their s-zones of the same size, denoted by (lls,f, l
l
s,r, w
l
s) (resp.
(lfs,f, l
f
s,r, wfs )). We let l
l
s,f ≤ lfs,f, lls,r ≤ lfs,r, and wls ≤ wfs
to further encourage the leader to choose comparatively more
aggressive actions than the follower.
x-axis
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Fig. 3: The c-zone (dark blue rectangle) and s-zone (light blue
rectangle) of a vehicle.
· Velocity, vˆ: As the vehicle is assumed to follow its pre-
planned path, its status of approaching its target can be
characterized by its speed along the path. In particular, we
set the term vˆ(τ |t) = vi(τ |t).
Note that the predicted stage reward (17) depends on the
predicted states of the two vehicles
(
si(τ |t), sj(τ |t)
)
. On the
basis of the vehicle kinematics model (10)-(14), sξ(τ |t), ξ ∈
{i, j}, is uniquely determined by the current state of vehicle
ξ, sξ(t), and the predicted acceleration sequence of vehicle
ξ, {aξ(k|t)}τ−1k=0, i.e., sξ(τ |t) = sξ
(
sξ(t), {aξ(k|t)}τ−1k=0
)
. We
define an action choice of vehicle ξ, ξ ∈ {i, j}, at the current
time instant t as γξ(t) = {aξ(τ |t)}N−1τ=0 , taking values in the
action set Γ = AN . Therefore, the cumulative reward (16) is
a function of si,j(t), γi(t), and γj(t), in consistent with the
expressions in our decision-making model (7).
The closed-loop operation of each vehicle is based on
receding-horizon optimization, i.e., once an acceleration se-
quence γi(t) = {ai(τ |t)}N−1τ=0 is determined, the ego vehicle
i applies the first acceleration value ai(0|t) for one time step,
i.e., ai(t) = ai(0|t), then repeats the decision-making process
(7) at the next time instant.
V. ADDITIONAL MODELING CONSIDERATIONS
To model the interactive behavior of human-driven vehicles
with higher fidelity, we incorporate several additional consid-
erations in our model. They are discussed in this section.
A. Courteous driving
A vehicle is not supposed to interrupt other vehicles’
nominal drives. More specifically, a vehicle is not supposed
to intentionally choose an action that would cause a collision
when other vehicles maintain their speeds. We account for this
by adjusting the action set for each vehicle, i.e., modify the
decision-making model (7) according to
γ∗i (t) ∈ arg max
γi∈Γi(t)
Q
i
(straffic(t), γi), (18)
where Γi(t) ⊂ Γ = AN is defined as
Γi(t) := Ai(t)×AN−1,
Ai(t) :=
{
ai(t) ∈ A
∣∣ ai(t) satisfies either ∀j 6= i, aj(t) = 0
=⇒ Sc
(
si,j(t+ 1)
)
= Sc
(
si,j(t), ai(t), aj(t)
)
= 0,
or ai(t) = min{a ∈ A}
}
. (19)
B. Limited perception ranges
Human drivers have limited ranges of visual perception. To
account for this, we assume that a driver only considers his/her
interactions with the other vehicles that are in a certain vicinity
of his/her own. In particular, we further modify the decision-
making model (7) according to
Q
i
(straffic(t), γi) = min
j∈Ωi(t)
Qi,j(si,j(t), γi), (20)
where Ωi(t) ⊂ {1, · · · , n} is defined as
Ωi(t) :=
{
j ∈ {1, · · · , n} ∣∣ j 6= i and√(
xj(t)− xi(t)
)2
+
(
yj(t)− yi(t)
)2 ≤ ωi}, (21)
9with ωi > 0 representing vehicle i’s maximum perception
distance.
We also note that such a modification decreases the com-
putational complexity of our model to a greater extent by
reducing the number of interacting vehicle pairs (i, j) in the
decision-making process (7) of each vehicle, and as a result,
further improves the scalability of our modeling framework.
C. Breakage of deadlocks via exploratory actions
As discussed at the end of Section II-A, in some scenarios
cyclic patterns, such as i ≺ j, j ≺ k, k ≺ l, and l ≺ i,
may occur and lead to deadlocks – no one decides to enter
the intersection or everyone gets stuck in the middle of the
intersection.
Such cyclic patterns also exist in real-world traffic. How-
ever, human drivers can usually break a deadlock. When
a deadlock occurs, we usually observe that one or more
human drivers will probe the possibility of going first and
such probes can often help the drivers reach an agreement
on their orders of passing through the intersection. On the
basis of such an observation, we propose a strategy to break
deadlocks via random exploratory actions, which is presented
as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Breakage of deadlocks via exploratory ac-
tions
Input : the states of all vehicles
straffic(t) =
(
s1(t), · · · , sn(t)
)
and the
acceleration choices of all vehicles(
a1(t), · · · , an(t)
)
obtained based on (7)
Output: the modified acceleration choices of all vehicles(
a1(t), · · · , an(t)
)
1 Ωconflict = Null;
2 for i = 1, · · · , n do
3 if i is the first vehicle coming from its origin lane
that has not exited the intersection (∆ρexi (t) > 0)
then add i to Ωconflict;
4 end
5 if vi(t) = 0 and ai(t) = 0, ∀i ∈ Ωconflict then
6 for i ∈ Ωconflict do
7 if {a ∈ Ai(t) | a > 0} 6= ∅ then
8 reset ai(t) based on ai(t) ={
min{a ∈ Ai(t) | a > 0}, with prob. = pi,
0, with prob. = 1− pi.
9 end
10 end
11 end
In Algorithm 2, lines 2-4 are used to identify the vehicles
that are in conflict. For example, vehicle i that has exited the
intersection is not a vehicle in conflict. As another example, if
there is a vehicle j that is entering/has entered the intersection
from the same lane as i, drives in front of i8, and has not exited
the intersection, then vehicle i is not a vehicle in conflict.
8There shall be no ambiguity in “in front of” here since i and j are
entering/have entered the intersection from the same lane.
Line 5 is used to identify the occurrence of a deadlock, i.e., all
of the vehicles in conflict have stopped and no one decides to
move according to decisions of (7). Then, lines 6-10 assign the
vehicles in conflict probabilities of making slight movements
to probe the possibility of going first.
The effectiveness of Algorithm 2 in terms of breaking
deadlocks is illustrated through the simulation case studies in
Section VII.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE VEHICLE INTERACTIVE
DECISION-MAKING MODEL
Human drivers can usually resolve traffic conflicts even
when they are interacting with other drivers whose driving
styles are a priori unknown. A model representing driver
decision-making is supposed to have reasonable robustness
against uncertainties in the behavior of interacting drivers.
To illustrate the robustness of decision-making using the
proposed model (7) based on pairwise leader-follower games,
we also consider another interactive decision-making model,
which is based on level-K game theory [29], [30] and has
been developed in [31]. We simulate the interactions between
model (7) and this alternative model in the simulation case
studies in Section VII and compare them.
The level-K model is premised on the idea that each
strategic agent in a non-cooperative multi-agent setting (each
vehicle at an uncontrolled intersection, in our setting) makes
decisions through a finite number of reasoning steps (called
“levels”), and different agents may have different reasoning
levels. The reasoning process starts from level-0. Level-0
typically represents an agent’s decisions of minimal rationality,
e.g., instinctive decisions, to pursue its goals without strategi-
cally accounting for its interactions with the other agents. On
the contrary, level-K, K ≥ 1, represents an agent’s decisions
optimally responding to the level-(K − 1) decisions of the
other agents. In particular, once the level-0 decisions, either
as time series or as a function of a vehicle’s own state and
its interacting vehicles’ states (denoted respectively by si and
s−i = (sj)j 6=i for vehicle i), are formulated, the corresponding
level-K, K ≥ 1, decisions can be computed through solving
the optimization problems
γKi ∈ arg max
γi∈Γi
Ri(si, s−i, γi,γK−1−i ) (22)
sequentially for K = 1, 2, · · · , where γK−1−i = (γK−1j )j 6=i
denotes the level-(K− 1) decisions of the vehicles interacting
with vehicle i, and γ0j = γ
0
j (sj , s−j) is the formulated level-0
decision of vehicle j.
To make this level-K reasoning and decision-making pro-
cess more explicit, we present it for the case of 2-agent interac-
tions formally as Algorithm 3. Algorithm 3 can be generalized
to the case of n-agent interactions straightforwardly.
In this paper, the state si(t), the action γi(t) =
{ai(τ |t)}N−1τ=0 , the kinematics model relating the predicted
states si(τ |t) to the action γi(t), and the reward function
Ri(t) of vehicle i are defined in the same way as in the
leader-follower game based decision-making model (7) (see
Section IV). In particular, since there are no leader-follower
relationships defined in the scheme of level-K models, when
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Algorithm 3: Level-K decision-making process in 2-agent
interactions
Input : the states of the ego agent s1 and the other
agent s2, the level of the ego agent K, a level-0
decision rule
Output: the level-K decision of the ego agent
1 k = 1;
2 if mod(K, 2) = 0 then
3 while k < K do
4 γk2 ∈ arg maxγ2∈Γ2 R2(s1, s2, γk−11 , γ2);
5 γk+11 ∈ arg maxγ1∈Γ1 R1(s1, s2, γ1, γk2 );
k ← k + 2;
6 end
7 else
8 while k < K − 1 do
9 γk1 ∈ arg maxγ1∈Γ1 R1(s1, s2, γ1, γk−12 );
10 γk+12 ∈ arg maxγ2∈Γ2 R2(s1, s2, γk1 , γ2);
k ← k + 2;
11 end
12 γK1 ∈ arg maxγ1∈Γ1 R1(s1, s2, γ1, γK−12 );
13 end
14 output γK1 .
computing its rewards, a level-K vehicle assumes that the s-
zones of all vehicles (including itself and all other vehicles in
interaction) are of the same size, denoted by (lKs,f, l
K
s,r, w
K
s ).
In this paper, a level-0 decision of vehicle i is to maximize
the reward Ri(t) while treating the other vehicles as stationary
obstacles, i.e., vj(τ |t) = 0 for all j 6= i and τ = 0, · · · ,N−1.
In this setting, a level-0 vehicle may represent an aggressive
driver in real-world traffic who assumes that the other drivers
will yield the right of way.
Note that a level-K agent optimally responds to level-(K−1)
interacting agents. When the levels of interacting agents are
not known a priori, online estimation and adaptation can be
incorporated in decision-making. In particular, we consider the
following decision-making model [31]:
γKi ∈ arg max
γi∈Γi
(23)
∑
kj∈{0,··· ,kmax},
j 6=i
[(∏
j 6=i
P(Kj = kj)
)
Ri
(
si, s−i, γi, (γ
kj
j )j 6=i
)]
,
where P(Kj = kj) represents vehicle i’s belief in that vehicle
j can be modeled as level-kj , which is updated after each time
step t according to the following algorithm: For each j 6= i,
if there exist kj , k′j ∈ {0, · · · , kmax} such that akjj (0|t) 6=
a
k′j
j (0|t), then
k˜j ∈ arg min
kj∈{0,··· ,kmax}
∣∣akjj (0|t)− aactualj (t)∣∣,
P(Kj = k˜j)← P(Kj = k˜j) + ∆P,
P(Kj = kj)← P(Kj = kj)
/( kmax∑
k′j=0
P(Kj = k′j)
)
,
∀ kj = 0, · · · , kmax; (24)
otherwise, P(Kj = kj) ← P(Kj = kj) for all kj =
0, · · · , kmax, where akjj (0|t) is vehicle j’s predicted accelera-
tion for time step t that is predicted by vehicle i at the time
instant t and using the level-kj model, and aactualj (t) is vehicle
j’s actual acceleration over time step t that is observed by
vehicle i after the time step t is over.
The model estimation algorithm (24) is to increase the belief
in the level-k˜j model whose prediction matches the actual
behavior of vehicle j best. It is triggered only when there is
at least one predicted value akjj (0|t) of some level-kj model
different from others; otherwise, when the predictions of all
models are the same, the ego vehicle has no information to
improve its beliefs [31], [38]. The decision-making process
(23) selects actions to maximize the weighted sum of re-
wards corresponding to all possible level combinations of the
interacting vehicles where the weights are the ego vehicle’s
beliefs in each level combination, i.e., to maximize the reward
expectation.
Since the decision-making model (23) is developed upon
the set of decision-making models (22) induced from level-
K game theory, and it adapts itself to uncertain interacting
agents using online model estimation (24), we refer to it as
an “adaptive level-K” decision-making model or model K.
VII. SIMULATION CASE STUDIES
In this section, we illustrate our game-theoretic framework
to model vehicle interactions at uncontrolled intersections
through multiple simulation case studies. The values of param-
eters used in all of the reported simulation results are collected
in Table I in Appendix B.
A. Case study 1: Reproducing real-world traffic scenarios
We first show that our proposed vehicle interaction model
can reproduce real-world traffic scenarios. The scenarios we
consider are extracted from the video dataset used in [39]. We
note that although the traffic data are collected at a signalized
intersection in Canmore, Alberta, we consider only the vehi-
cles that are legally allowed to enter the intersection (i.e., under
a green light or making a right turn), the behavior of which
can be modeled similarly to that at uncontrolled intersections.
In particular, we initialize the vehicles in our simulation based
on the positions and velocities of the corresponding vehicles in
the video, and compare the evolution of the scenario simulated
using our model to that provided by the video. The results of
a scenario involving 3 interacting vehicles are shown in Fig. 4
and those of a scenario involving 4 interacting vehicles are
shown in Fig. 5. It can be observed that our model reproduces
the scenarios with satisfactory accuracy.
B. Case study 2: Completely symmetric
As discussed at the end of Section II-A and at the beginning
of Section V-C, one type of challenging scenarios at uncon-
trolled intersections for both human drivers and autonomous
vehicles are scenarios where no one has a determinable role
of the leader. Among these scenarios, the ones where all the
vehicles arrive at the entrances of a geometrically symmetrical
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Fig. 4: Real-world traffic scenario with 3 interacting vehicles.
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Fig. 5: Real-world traffic scenario with 4 interacting vehicles.
intersection at the same time with the same speed may be par-
ticularly challenging. In this section, we show the simulation
results of two such “completely symmetric” cases.
Both cases involve a geometrically symmetrical four-lane
(two for each direction) four-way intersection. In the first case,
8 vehicles are approaching the entrances of the intersection
from each of the eight forward lanes with the same initial
distance to their corresponding entrance points ∆ρen(0) and
the same initial speed v(0). Their target lanes all correspond
to maneuvers of going straight to cross the intersection. In the
second case, 4 vehicles are approaching the entrances of the
intersection from each of the four leftmost forward lanes of
the road arms with the same ∆ρen(0) and v(0). Their target
lanes all correspond to maneuvers of making left turns. In both
cases, all of the vehicles are using the decision-making model
(7) based on pairwise leader-follower games combined with
Algorithm 2 to handle deadlocks. The simulation results are
shown in Figs. 6 and 7.
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Fig. 6: Completely symmetric case 1. Figures (a-f) show the
simulation snapshots at a series of sequential steps.
In Fig. 6, the eight vehicles arrive at the entrances of
the intersection at the same time (Fig. 6(a)). According to
Algorithm 1, no vehicle holds an overall leader role (being
the leader in every pairwise interaction). As a result, all of the
eight vehicles stop at the intersection entrances (Fig. 6(b)).
According to Algorithm 2, a deadlock is detected and the
blue vehicle makes a probing acceleration (Fig. 6(c)). Then,
the symmetry is broken: the blue vehicle becomes the over-
all leader and crosses the intersection first (Fig. 6(d)). The
other vehicles cross the intersection in a clockwise order
(Figs. 6(e)(f)). In Fig. 7, after the four vehicles arrive at the
entrances of the intersection at the same time, the left purple
vehicle makes a probing acceleration (Fig. 7(a)) and gets to
its target lane first (Fig. 7(b)). Similar to Fig. 6, the other
vehicles then pass through the intersection in a clockwise order
(Figs. 7(c)(d)).
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Fig. 7: Completely symmetric case 2. Figures (a-d) show the
simulation snapshots at a series of sequential steps.
From the above “completely symmetric” cases we can
observe that our model exhibits reasonable behavior expected
in traffic and has good capability in resolving traffic conflicts
in challenging scenarios. We note that there is no centralized
control or management in our model to guide the vehicles
to resolve their conflicts – the vehicles make their decisions
independently. In particular, they take into account their inter-
actions when making decisions. Such a process is consistent
with drivers’ decision-making in real-world traffic. Moreover,
when a deadlock occurs, the vehicles try to resolve it through
exploratory movements, which is also consistent with the way
in which human drivers resolve deadlocks in real-world traffic.
C. Case study 3: Leader-follower versus adaptive level-K
As discussed at the beginning of Section VI, a model
representing driver interactive decision-making is supposed to
have a reasonable capability of resolving traffic conflicts when
interacting with other drivers whose driving styles are a priori
unknown. To illustrate such capability of the decision-making
model (7) based on pairwise leader-follower games, we let
vehicles that make decisions using (7) interact with vehicles
that make decisions using models different from (7), in partic-
ular, using the adaptive level-K decision-making model (23).
Note that (23) does not take into account the leader-follower
relationships among vehicles, and thus, a vehicle using (23)
may not yield the right of way to another vehicle that is
supposed to be the leader in their interactions.
We initialize the traffic scenario as follows: Three vehicles
are approaching the entrances of a geometrically symmetrical
four-lane four-way intersection from three different road arms.
Vehicle 1 (blue) is coming from the bottom arm and is making
a left turn to the left arm; vehicle 2 (red) is coming from the
right arm and is making a left turn to the bottom arm; and
vehicle 3 (green) is coming from the top arm and is going
straight to the bottom arm. The three vehicles are initialized
with the same ∆ρen(0) and v(0). At first, we let vehicle 1
using (7) interact with vehicles 2 and 3 using (23), and the
simulation results are shown in Fig. 8 (left column). Then, we
let vehicle 1 using (23) interact with vehicles 2 and 3 using (7),
and the simulation results are shown in Fig. 8 (right column).
In Figs. 8(a-d) where vehicle 1 (blue) is using (7), according
to Algorithm 1, it is the follower of vehicles 2 (red) and
3 (green). As a result, it yields the right of way to both
vehicles 2 and 3. Vehicles 2 and 3 pass through the intersection
ahead of vehicle 1 based on (23) and (24). Fig. 8(e) shows
the model estimation time histories of the three vehicles:
it can be observed that as vehicle 1 decides to yield the
right of way, the belief that it can be modeled as level-1
(corresponding to the most conservative driver) increases over
7− 12 [s] (when vehicles 2 and 3 are inside the intersection).
In Figs. 8(a) and (f-i) where vehicles 2 (red) and 3 (green) are
using (7), according to Algorithm 1, vehicle 3 is the leader
in every pairwise interaction. As a result, it decides to cross
the intersection first. Such a result illustrates that our model
(7) is not conservative when it has the legitimate right of way.
Different from Figs. 8(a-d), vehicle 1 decides to pass through
the intersection ahead of vehicle 2 based on (23) and (24). This
is because when vehicle 2 yields the right of way to vehicle 3,
vehicle 1 thinks that vehicle 2 is a conservative driver (which
can be seen from the model estimation time histories Fig. 8(i),
where the belief that vehicle 2 can be modeled as level-1
increases at the beginning). Thus, vehicle 1 decides to go
ahead of this conservative driver. Note that the adaptive level-
K decision-making model (23) and (24) does not account for
the right-of-way traffic rules. Although vehicle 2 is supposed
to have the right of way over vehicle 1 when they arrive at the
entrances of the intersection, it decides to wait until vehicle 1
passes because of vehicle 1’s aggressive preemption.
The above “leader-follower versus adaptive level-K” cases
illustrate that our model (7) is capable of making effective use
of its legitimate rights of way in resolving traffic conflicts.
Nevertheless, when encountering unexpected disruptions, it
can quickly adapt its strategy to avoid traffic incidents.
D. Case study 4: Randomized traffic scenarios
To show the capability of the proposed framework to
model vehicle interactions at a wide range of uncontrolled
intersection traffic scenarios and statistically evaluate its per-
formance, we randomly generate the layout and geometry
parameters {M (m)f }Nm=1, {M (m)b }Nm=1, and {φ(m)}Nm=1 of
the intersections for each fixed number of intersection arms
N ∈ {3, 4, 5}, randomly generate the origin lanes, target lanes,
initial distances to intersection entrances ∆ρen(0), and initial
speeds v(0) of the vehicles for each fixed number of vehicles
n ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}, and have 100 simulation runs for each
pair of (N,n).
In particular, we sample {M (m)f }Nm=1, {M (m)b }Nm=1 based
on categorical distributions and {φ(m)}Nm=1 based on truncated
normal distributions9 as follows:
9with mean 2mpi
N
and standard deviation pi
24
truncated to the range
[
2mpi
N
−
pi
8
, 2mpi
N
+ pi
8
]
.
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Fig. 8: Leader-follower versus adaptive level-K case 1 (left):
the blue car is using the decision-making model (7) and the
other two cars are using (23) and (24), and case 2 (right):
the blue car is using (23) and (24) and the other two cars
are using (7). Figures (a-d) show the simulation snapshots at
a series of sequential steps of case 1, and figure (e) shows
the corresponding model estimation time histories of the three
vehicles (the blue curves correspond to the level-0, 1, and
2 belief histories of the blue car, etc); figures (a) and (f-
h) show the simulation snapshots at a series of sequential
steps of case 2, and figure (i) shows the corresponding model
estimation time histories of the three vehicles.
M
(m)
ξ ∼ Cat
(
{1, 2, 3}, {0.15, 0.7, 0.15}
)
, ξ ∈ {f, b},
φ(m) ∼ Normal
(2mpi
N
,
pi
24
,
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8
,
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N
+
pi
8
])
,
for each m = 1, · · · , N . Once the intersection has been
created, we assign each vehicle’s origin road arm based on
a uniform distribution over all road arms, and assign its origin
lane based on a uniform distribution over all forward lanes of
its origin road arm. After that, we assign its target road arm
and target lane based on uniform distributions over, respec-
tively, all acceptable road arms and all acceptable backward
lanes of the assigned target road arms, where “acceptable”
means satisfying the traffic rule constraints described at the
beginning of Section III-B. Then, each vehicle’s ∆ρen(0) and
v(0) are initialized based on uniform distributions over the
ranges [10, 28] [m] and [2, 4] [m/s]. Furthermore, we enforce
a minimum initial separation, ρsep, between any two vehicles
that are initialized on the same origin lane – if ∆ρeni (0) of
vehicle i is in the range of [∆ρenj (0) − ρsep,∆ρenj (0) + ρsep]
for any vehicle j that has been initialized before vehicle i
and is on the same origin lane of vehicle i, then ∆ρeni (0) is
re-sampled as above.
Some of the simulated traffic scenarios are shown in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 9: Randomized traffic scenarios at randomized inter-
sections. Figures (a-b) show the snapshots of a three-way
intersection simulation at two sequential steps, figures (c-d)
show the snapshots of a four-way intersection simulation at
two sequential steps, and figures (e-f) show the snapshots of
a five-way intersection simulation at two sequential steps.
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1) Statistical evaluation: We define several statistical met-
rics to evaluate the proposed framework to model vehicle
interactions at uncontrolled intersections, including the rate
of success (SR), the rate of collision (CR), and the rate of
deadlock (DR). The rate of success is defined as the proportion
of simulation runs where all the vehicles safely (without
colliding with any other vehicles) reach their terminal points
(xterm, yterm) within 60 [s] of simulation time. The rate of
collision is defined as the proportion of simulation runs where
at least one vehicle collision occurs (once a vehicle collision
occurs at a simulation step, the simulation run stops at that
step). The rate of deadlock is defined as the proportion of
simulation runs where no vehicle collision occurs but there
is at least one vehicle that does not reach its terminal point
(xterm, yterm) within 60 [s] of simulation time. We note that
based on their definitions, SR + CR + DR = 1.
A model representing driver interactive decision-making is
supposed to have reasonably high SR, and reasonably low CR
and DR. The evaluation results of our model are shown in
Fig. 10.
It can be observed that as the numbers of road arms and
of vehicles increase, which correspond to traffic scenarios of
increased complexity, the rates of collision and of deadlock
also increase. In three-way and four-way intersection traffic
scenarios with 2 or 4 vehicles, no collisions or deadlocks are
observed. When up to 10 vehicles are interacting at three-
way or four-way intersections, the rates of success are higher
than 0.9. It can also be observed that five-way intersections
are more challenging (with higher rates of collision and of
deadlock compared to three-way and four-way intersections)
– the rate of success drops to 0.84 for the case of 10
interacting vehicles. This is because more vehicles may get to
the entrances of the intersection or be inside the intersection
at the same time for five-way intersections compared to three-
way and four-way intersections, which may lead to higher
chances of traffic conflicts. Indeed, five-way intersections are
also more challenging to drivers compared to three-way and
four-way intersections in real-world traffic scenarios.
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Fig. 10: Statistical evaluation of the vehicle interaction model.
Light color: SR, medium color: DR, dark color: CR.
Furthermore, by watching the animations of the simula-
tion runs, we observe that most collisions are caused by
simultaneous exploratory actions of two or more vehicles in
deadlock scenarios. Note that in Algorithm 2, a vehicle is
not permitted to accelerate if its acceleration would lead to a
collision when the other vehicles in conflict remain stopped.
However, if two or more vehicles accelerate at the same time,
it is possible that their simultaneous accelerations lead to a
collision although each single acceleration would not. Two of
the failure scenarios are shown in Fig. 11. The rates of failures
(CR+DR) resulting from our framework are much lower than
those resulting from the scheme in [20] (3% versus almost
50% for the case of 6 vehicles at four-way intersections). Note
that communications and negotiations among human drivers in
deadlock scenarios, such as through eye contacts or gestures,
are not considered in our framework.
(a) (b)
Fig. 11: Two failure cases. (a) A deadlock scenario. (b) A
collision scenario.
For the vehicles that safely reach their terminal points within
60 [s] of simulation time, we count their average completion
time (CT), where a vehicle’s CT is defined as the duration (in
[s] of simulation time) from the simulation initialization to the
time instant when the vehicle reaches its terminal point. The
average CT can reflect how conservative the decision-making
model is. The average CTs for different numbers of road arms
and vehicles are shown in Fig. 12.
It can be observed that as the numbers of vehicles increase,
the vehicles need more time to pass through the intersections.
In particular, for the cases of 2 and 4 interacting vehicles,
the average CTs exhibited by our model correspond to level-
B in the real-world traffic quality rating system called the
“level-of-service” (LOS) for unsignalized intersections defined
based on the average control delay [40]. LOS-B corresponds
to traffic with a high degree of freedom and a small amount
of interactions and is characterized by 10-15 [s] of average
control delay [41]. For the cases of 6-10 interacting vehicles,
the average CTs exhibited by our model correspond to LOS-
C, which corresponds to traffic with restricted freedom due
to significant interactions and is characterized by 15-25 [s] of
average control delay. Furthermore, among three-way, four-
way, and five-way intersections, the vehicles spend the least
times to pass through four-way intersections – this may be
explained by the observation that the “right-of-way” rules (see
Section II-A) may function best for four-way intersections,
which, as a matter of fact, are most common in real-world
road networks.
2) Computational complexity: In addition to rate of success
and average completion time, we also care about the compu-
tational effort of the proposed framework to model vehicle
interactions at uncontrolled intersections, as it determines the
framework’s scalability to model traffic scenarios of increased
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Fig. 12: Average completion time (ACT). The black vertical
bars represent the standard deviations.
complexity. As mentioned in Section II-C, traditional gener-
alizations of leader-follower game-theoretic decision-making
models to n-player settings require exponentially increased
computational efforts to solve for solutions as the number
of players increases [34]. However, thanks to the pairwise
decoupling of vehicle interactions, the computational com-
plexity of our decision-making model (7) (solved using a
tree-search method) increases only linearly with the number
of interacting vehicles increasing. We use the average and
the worst computation times per vehicle per step (in [s] of
real time) to represent our model’s computational complexity,
which are, respectively, the average and the worst CPU times
for one vehicle to confirm its action choice over one step
(including the time to compute the initial action choice using
(7) and the time to adjust the action choice using Algorithm 2
if a deadlock is detected). The results for different numbers of
road arms and vehicles are shown in Fig. 13. The simulations
are performed on Matlab R2016a platform using an Intel Core
i7-4790 3.60 GHz PC with Windows 10 and 16.0 GB of RAM.
The computation times are calculated using Matlab tic-toc
command.
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Fig. 13: Average (dark-colored bars) and worst (light-colored
bars) computation times per vehicle per step.
It can be observed that: 1) As the number of vehicles
increases, the computation time increases. 2) For four-way
and five-way intersections, the increase in computation time
slows down with the number of vehicles increasing. And 3)
the increase in computation time slows down as the number
of road arms increases from three to four and five. The
explanations to 2) and 3) may be that as the numbers of
vehicles and road arms increase, the vehicles are more likely
to be outside each other’s perception range, and as a result,
the number of vehicles involved in the computation of model
(7) decreases (see Section V-B). In general, the increase in
computational effort for our decision-making model (7) to
solve for solutions is only linear in the increase in the number
of interacting vehicles. And in turn, the total computation time
for all vehicles to solve for decisions is quadratic in the number
of vehicles. This makes our framework have reasonably good
scalability to model traffic scenarios at uncontrolled intersec-
tions of increased complexity.
In contrast, the adaptive level-K decision-making model
described in Section VI may not be as well-scalable as the
decision-making model (7) based on pairwise leader-follower
games. This is because the adaptive level-K model needs to
first compute the level-k decision of each of the interacting
vehicles for k = 0, 1, · · · , kmax using (22) in order to estimate
their levels using (24), and then compute the optimal decision
of the ego vehicle using (23), which itself involves combina-
torially increased computational complexity in the number of
interacting vehicles.
VIII. SUMMARY
In this paper, we proposed a game-theoretic framework for
modeling the interactive behavior of vehicles in multi-vehicle
traffic scenarios at uncontrolled intersections. Our approach
takes into account common traffic rules to designate a leader-
follower relationship between each pair of interacting vehicles.
A decision-making process based on pairwise leader-follower
relationships is used to represent interactive decision-making
of vehicles. Additional modeling considerations, representing
courteous driving, limited perception ranges, and the capability
of human drivers in resolving deadlock scenarios through
probing, are also accounted for in the process.
In particular, uncontrolled intersections were modeled based
on a parametrization scheme, to which the proposed vehicle
interaction modeling approach was applied. This way, the
interactive behavior of vehicles at a rich set of uncontrolled
intersection traffic scenarios (with various numbers of interact-
ing vehicles, intersection layouts and geometries, etc) could be
modeled.
Simulation results were reported and showed that the vehicle
interaction model exhibited reasonable behavior expected in
traffic. The performance of the model was then evaluated based
on several statistics, including the rate of success, the rate of
collision, the rate of deadlock, the average completion time, as
well as the average and the worst computation times. It was
shown that the model had reasonably high rates of success
in resolving traffic conflicts and average completion times
matching the level-of-service criteria used for rating real-world
traffic. Moreover, thanks to the pairwise decoupling of vehicle
interactions, the computational complexity of the decision-
making model increases linearly as the number of interacting
vehicles increases, which improves the model’s scalability.
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Furthermore, another game-theoretic model to represent
interactive decision-making of vehicles was considered. The
approaches to modeling vehicle interactions based on the
model proposed in this paper and this alternative model were
discussed and compared in simulations.
The framework proposed in this paper for modeling multi-
vehicle interactions at uncontrolled intersections can be used
as simulation tool for calibration, validation and verification
of autonomous driving systems [28], [42], [43]. In addition,
it may also be used in high-level decision-making algorithms
of autonomous vehicles [31], [38], and to support intersection
automation/autonomous intersection management [37]. More-
over, vehicle interactions in some other traffic scenarios, such
as highway merging and driving in parking lots, may be
modeled based on the proposed framework with modified road
layouts and geometries. These are left as topics for our future
research.
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APPENDIX A
The three segments of P are described using the following
equations:
a1x+ b1y + c1 = 0 if ρ ≤ ρen,
(x− xc)2 + (y − yc)2 = r2 if ρen < ρ ≤ ρex,
a2x+ b2y + c2 = 0 if ρ > ρex, (25)
in which (a1, b1, c1) and (a2, b2, c2) are the parameters
of the line segments corresponding to the coefficients
(sin(φ(m)),− cos(φ(m)), kwlane2 ) in (9), where m and k are
determined by the origin lane and target lane of the vehicle,
and (xc, yc, r) are the center coordinates and radius of the arc
segment. The unknowns (xc, yc, r) and ρex are computed by
first solving the following function set:
xc =
a1b2x(ρ
ex)− a2b1x(ρen) + a1a2y(ρen)− a1a2y(ρex)
a1b2 − a2b1
yc =
b1b2x(ρ
ex)− b1b2x(ρen) + a1b2y(ρen)− a2b1y(ρex)
a1b2 − a2b1
r =
√
a21 + b
2
1
(
a2y(ρ
en)− b2x(ρen) + b2x(ρex)− a2y(ρex)
)
a1b2 − a2b1
x(ρex) = −−b
2
2xc + a2b2yc + a2c2
a22 + b
2
2
y(ρex) = −−a
2
2yc + a2b2xc + b2c2
a22 + b
2
2
, (26)
where (x(ρen), y(ρen)) are given based on the intersection
layout (see Section III-A); and then computing ρex by:
ρex = ρen + r∆φ, ∆φ = arccos
( u>v
‖u‖‖v‖
)
, (27)
u =
[
x(ρen)− xc, y(ρen)− yc
]>
, v =
[
x(ρex)− xc, y(ρex)− yc
]>
.
Nan Li received the B.S. degree in automotive engi-
neering from Tongji University, Shanghai, China, in
2014, and the M.S. degree in mechanical engineering
from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI,
USA, in 2016, where he is currently pursuing the
Ph.D. degree in aerospace engineering. His current
research interests include predictive control, stochas-
tic control, and application of game theory to multi-
agent systems.
APPENDIX B
TABLE I: Simulation parameter values.
Variable(s) Value(s) Unit Remarks
[vmin, vmax] [0, 5] m/s speed range
∆t 1 s sampling period
A {−4,−2, 0, 2} m/s2 {hard brake, decelerate,maintain, accelerate}
δ 0.5 m threshold fordifferentiating distances
w1,2,3, wˆ {100, 5, 1}, 14 reward function weights
(lc, wc) (6, 2.4) m c-zone size
(lls,f, l
l
s,r, w
l
s) (5, 4, 2.8) m
s-zone size
for leader
(lfs,f, l
f
s,r, w
f
s ) (14, 4, 2.8) m
s-zone size
for follower
N 2 prediction horizon
λ 0.6 discount factor
ωi,
∀ i ∈ {1, · · · , n} 30 m
maximum perception
distance
pi,
∀ i ∈ {1, · · · , n} 0.25
probing movement
probability
(lKs,f, l
K
s,r, w
K
s ) (9.5, 4, 2.8) m
s-zone size for level-K
models, K = 0, · · · ,
kmax, and for model K
kmax 2 highest level-K model
∆P 23
model K belief
update parameter
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